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We provide a measure of equality of educational opportunity in 54 countries, estimated as the 
effect of family background on student performance in two international TIMSS tests. We 
then show how organizational features of the education system affect equality of educational 
opportunity. Our model predicts that late tracking and a long pre-school cycle are beneficial 
for equality, while pre-school enrollment is detrimental at low levels of enrollment and 
beneficial at higher levels. Using cross-country variations in education policies and their 
interaction with family background at the student level, we provide empirical evidence 
supportive of these predictions. 
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1. Introduction 
Equality in educational outcomes is a crucial determinant of the extent of equality of 
opportunity and intergenerational mobility achieved by societies. Nickell (2004), for example, 
shows that a large part of the existing cross-country variation in earnings inequality can be 
attributed to cross-country variation in skill dispersion. It is, therefore, of prime policy interest 
to understand the effects of education policies such as ability tracking, pre-school education, 
length of the school day and educational spending on the educational success of children from 
various family backgrounds. The direction of these effects is, however, by no means 
straightforward from a theory point of view, and empirical evidence is limited. The lack of 
empirical evidence derives from the fact that variation in the organization of education 
systems is largely lacking within countries, and where it is not, it is unlikely to be exogenous 
to students’ performance and family backgrounds.  
This state of affairs is the starting point of our paper which makes three contributions. 
First, it provides a comparable measure for 54 countries of how strongly children’s 
educational performance is related to their family background (Section 2). We interpret this 
measure as a proxy for the extent of inequality of opportunity. Second, the paper develops a 
theoretical model that traces the effect of different education policies on the equality of 
opportunity (Section 3). Third, we present empirical evidence, using cross-country variations 
in education policies and their interaction with family background at the individual student 
level to identify the impact of education policies on equality of opportunity (Section 4). 
The database used combines two related extensive international student achievement tests, 
the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and its replication for a 
partly different set of countries (TIMSS-Repeat) (Section 2.1). These datasets provide 
information on students’ educational performance, their family background and relevant 
control variables for individual students in each participating country. As our main indicator 
of family background, we use the number of books in the students’ home. As suggested in the 
sociological literature, books at home provide a powerful proxy for the educational, social and 
economic background of the students’ families. Moreover, previous research on the same and 
other datasets suggests that in most countries, books at home are the single most important 
predictor of student performance, even surpassing parental education (Wößmann 2003, 2004; 
Fuchs and Wößmann 2004). Furthermore, data coverage on this indicator is superior to 
parental education, and we argue that it is more readily comparable across countries.    2
This database allows us to estimate an index of equality of educational opportunity in 54 
countries (Section 2.2). More precisely, the index measures the inequality of educational 
outcomes for children from different family backgrounds. Given the strong relationship 
between education and economic outcomes, our measure can thus also serve as an index of 
the inequality of opportunity later in life for children from different family backgrounds. To 
our knowledge, no previous evidence on the inequality of opportunity across countries has 
been available on a comparable scale. In estimating our index at the micro level, we make 
sure that it is not affected by cross-country differences in the immigrant population, but only 
reflects performance differences associated with socio-economic background.  
Our results show that equality of opportunity as measured by our index varies considerably 
across countries (Section 2.3). Among OECD countries, the impact of our family-background 
measure on student performance is largest in England, Scotland, Hungary and Germany and 
lowest in France, Canada, Portugal and Flemish Belgium. The family-background effect in 
the former countries is on average 2.7 times as large as in the latter countries. The United 
States falls in the top quarter of the most unequal OECD countries.  
To understand the substantial cross-country variation in the extent of equality of 
educational opportunity, we develop a model to explain how key organizational features of 
school systems affect the extent to which equality of educational opportunity is achieved. 
These features include the duration of and enrollment in pre-school education (Section 3.1) 
and the timing of the change from comprehensiveness to ability tracking in the school system 
(Section 3.2). Numerical solution of the model suggests that late tracking and a long pre-
school cycle are beneficial for equality of opportunity, while pre-school enrollment has a 
detrimental influence at low levels of enrollment and a beneficial influence at higher levels 
(Section 3.3).  
Combining the observed variation in the index of educational inequality with country-level 
data on features of the education systems, we can test the predictions of our model 
empirically. Our preferred empirical identification strategy is to estimate how the different 
country-level features of the school systems interact with the family-background measure at 
the student level in determining student performance, while at the same time controlling for 
unobserved country heterogeneity by country fixed effects (Section 4.1).  
The empirical results strongly support our theoretical model. We find that the family-
background effect is larger (i.e. equality of opportunity is lower), the earlier a country tracks 
its students into different school types by ability (Section 4.2). Also, the family-background   3
effect is larger in countries with shorter pre-school education. With respect to pre-school 
enrollment, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship, with educational inequality increasing 
up to an enrollment of roughly 60 percent and decreasing thereafter. These results prove 
robust to more extensive model specifications, in which we do not find a statistically 
significant difference in the equality of opportunity by school starting age or between half-day 
and whole-day school systems. Neither does the observed equality of opportunity differ with 
average educational spending, nor with the country’s level of economic development. At least 
in the OECD sample, there is also no statistically significant relationship between equality of 
opportunity and a country’s mean test score. Finally, the family-background effect is larger in 
countries with a larger share of private funding, but at the same time, it is smaller in countries 
with a larger share of private provision.  
Our theoretical and empirical results thus show how school systems can accelerate 
intergenerational mobility. The results suggest that education policies such as comprehensive 
school systems and extensive early-childhood education can increase the equality of 
educational opportunity for children from different family backgrounds.1 The empirical 
evidence on the other hand also suggests that extending the school day into the afternoon, 
bringing forward the age at which compulsory education begins or increasing educational 
spending do not appear to have a significant effect on the equality of educational opportunity. 
There also does not appear to exist an efficiency-equity tradeoff in education in the sense that 
more equal systems would systematically affect the mean performance of their students, at 
least not among OECD countries. Relying on private spending to finance education varies 
positively with increased inequality of educational opportunity, relying on private production 
of schooling on the other hand varies positively with equality of educational opportunity.  
2.  Estimating Equality of Opportunity across Countries 
2.1 Data 
2.1.1 The Two TIMSS International Student Achievement Studies 
To derive estimates of the equality of educational opportunity, we employ student-level micro 
data from two extensive international student achievement tests. The first test is the Third 
                                                 
1 For selected previous analyses of ability tracking, cf. Betts and Skolnick (2000), Figlio and Page (2002), 
Epple et al. (2002), Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004), Meghir and Palme (2005) and Hanushek and 
Wößmann (2005). For recent evidence on the effects of early-childhood education, cf. Garces et al. (2002), 
Magnuson et al. (2004) and Schweinhart et al. (2005); Barnett (1992) and Currie (2001) provide surveys of 
previous analyses.    4
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995 (data released in 
1997) by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), 
an independent cooperation of national, partly governmental, research agencies. The second 
test is the TIMSS-Repeat study, conducted in 1999 (data released in 2001) also by the IEA as 
a replication of the first study. All participating countries received the same test items, so that 
the ensuing measures of educational performance in math and science are directly comparable 
across countries.2 Furthermore, both tests draw random samples of schools to provide 
representative samples of students in each participating country.3  
The target population of TIMSS-Repeat was the upper of the two adjacent grades with the 
largest share of 13-year-olds (usually eighth grade). While the TIMSS-95 study also targeted 
additional grade levels, we restrict our TIMSS-95 data to the eighth-grade students to ensure 
comparability. For our analyses, TIMSS-95 yielded internationally comparable data for 
representative samples of students in 40 countries, and TIMSS-Repeat for 38 countries.4 
Since the sample of participating countries differed considerably between the two tests, the 
pooled TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat database contains data on more than 300,000 students from 
54 different countries, which is the biggest sample of participating countries in comparable 
international tests to date (see Table 1 for a list of the countries).  
Both studies had basically the same design of a curriculum-valid test. Given that two-
thirds of the test items of TIMSS-95 had been released to the public after the study, these 
items had to be replaced in TIMSS-Repeat by substitute items with similar content, format 
and level of difficulty. Because of the similarity of the test designs, it is possible to splice the 
eighth-grade data of the two TIMSS tests together. We do this by singling out the test scores 
of those 24 countries that participated in both studies and standardizing all scores according to 
the mean and the standard deviation of this sub-sample. We then standardize the test scores to 
have a standard deviation of 100 across all countries in the pooled dataset.  
In this paper, we use the mean of the math and the science test scores of each student as 
our measure of educational performance, pooling the two TIMSS tests for those countries that 
                                                 
2 The development of the test contents was a cooperative process involving national research coordinators 
from all participating countries, and all participating countries endorsed the curriculum framework. Both studies 
also performed a test-curriculum matching analysis that restricted the analysis to items definitely covered in each 
country’s curriculum, which made little difference for the overall achievement patterns. 
3 Beaton et al. (1996), Gonzalez and Smith (1997) and Martin and Kelly (1996, 1997) provide detailed 
information on the TIMSS-95 database. For more information on the TIMSS-Repeat database, see Mullis et al. 
(2000), Martin et al. (2000) and Gonzalez and Miles (2001). 
4 England and Scotland, as well as the Flemish and the French school system in Belgium, count as individual 
countries here as they have separate school systems that participated separately in the tests.   
Table 1: Educational Performance and Family Background by Country 
  TIMSS performance    Books at home
a  
  Mean  SD  1 (0-10) 2 (11-25) 3 (26-100) 4 (101-200)  5 (200+)
Mean 
category 
Australia  541.4 87.1 3.3 7.0 24.0 25.8  40.0 3.9
Austria  546.9 88.7 10.5 17.5 31.4 16.7  23.8 3.3
Belgium (Flemish)  558.2 73.3 14.6 19.4 32.1 16.1  17.7 3.0
Belgium (French)  494.9 78.7 6.9 10.2 28.0 20.7  34.2 3.7
Bulgaria 529.2  83.1 8.7 11.6 23.8 19.2  36.6 3.6
Canada  537.0 75.6 4.5 10.8 28.1 24.6  31.9 3.7
Chile 423.4  78.2 20.0 31.6 28.2 11.0  9.2 2.6
Colombia 390.5  62.4 25.6 31.5 26.6 9.0  7.3 2.4
Cyprus 474.3  79.3 5.4 18.4 35.0 22.9  18.3 3.3
Czech Republic  555.7 79.5 0.8 5.8 31.9 30.7  30.9 3.9
Denmark  486.4 78.3 3.3 8.5 30.0 21.1  37.1 3.8
England  530.0 87.3 6.0 13.0 29.4 22.6  28.9 3.6
Finland  543.5 65.4 3.5 14.0 38.7 21.9  21.9 3.4
France  514.9 67.5 5.4 17.1 36.4 21.1  19.9 3.3
Germany  517.5 89.3 8.1 13.8 26.2 18.8  33.1 3.5
Greece  486.8 80.0 5.0 22.3 42.7 18.2  11.8 3.1
Hong Kong  562.1  77.7 24.8 28.3 28.2 9.6  9.1 2.5
Hungary  550.6 82.0 3.5 10.1 25.1 41.0  39.9 3.8
Iceland  486.3 70.5 0.7 5.2 29.0 28.4  36.7 4.0
Indonesia 433.2  86.5 25.7 38.6 25.8 5.3  4.5 2.2
Iran 447.6  68.0 33.2 32.3 19.5 7.1  8.0 2.2
Ireland  530.4 87.2 7.1 16.1 33.8 21.1  21.8 3.3
Israel 501.9  94.1 4.8 15.6 32.3 23.6  23.7 3.4
Italy  502.0 80.8 12.1 25.2 27.7 14.8  20.2 3.1
Japan  583.5 80.4 13.9 19.4 31.2 18.0  17.5 3.1
Jordan 455.1  94.8 21.3 30.5 28.4 29.7  10.0 2.6
Korea  584.7 85.5 9.7 11.2 34.8 23.4  20.8 3.3
Kuwait 403.9  57.0 22.3 26.8 38.3 10.2  12.5 2.6
Latvia 501.6  74.0 1.4 5.2 18.7 23.1  51.6 4.2
Lithuania 485.4  75.2 4.9 18.2 35.5 20.8  20.6 3.3
Macedonia 467.9  87.1 15.4 38.1 30.0 9.1  7.3 2.5
Malaysia 520.4  74.0 13.0 34.1 32.3 12.0  8.8 2.7
Moldova 478.5  82.4 20.2 32.7 27.5 11.0  8.5 2.5
Morocco 344.1  81.2 37.4 35.2 39.7 4.9  3.0 2.0
Netherlands  552.2 73.8 8.0 15.7 32.1 21.0  23.1 3.4
New Zealand  514.9 85.4 4.4 8.7 25.7 24.6  36.6 3.8
Norway  512.3 78.3 2.3 5.7 25.2 22.9  45.0 4.0
Philippines 376.4  93.7 37.4 30.5 19.3 6.2  6.5 2.1
Portugal  462.3 61.3 10.4 26.2 31.6 14.5  17.3 3.0
Romania 483.4  88.8 19.1 22.8 25.6 13.2  19.4 2.9
Russian Federation  539.0  84.7 3.1 12.0 33.2 26.7 24.9 3.6
Scotland  504.7 86.5 11.2 17.3 28.2 18.7  24.7 3.3
Singapore 613.4  83.0 11.8 22.0 40.6 13.8  11.8 2.9
Slovak Republic  546.6 77.9 2.1 12.5 43.7 23.8  17.8 3.4
Slovenia 547.8  78.5 3.1 15.8 42.1 21.1  17.9 3.3
South Africa  480.6  97.3 38.9 29.3 15.5 6.6  9.6 2.2
Spain  498.8 68.1 3.7 18.4 32.5 19.7  25.8 3.5
Sweden  524.5 80.5 3.1 8.0 24.3 23.9  40.7 3.9
Switzerland  531.4 81.9 7.9 16.2 30.3 20.1  25.5 3.4
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei)  592.8 90.2 17.5 23.2 31.2 11.9  16.3 2.9
Thailand 505.9  74.2 20.1 33.7 30.1 8.6  7.5 2.5
Tunisia 452.5  56.9 21.4 35.9 24.5 9.3  8.9 2.5
Turkey  446.8 73.3 21.6 36.7 27.6 8.2  5.9 2.4
United States  518.9 89.2 8.1 13.2 28.3 21.0  29.4 3.5
Notes: Mean performance: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test score (mean of math and science), re-scaled, weighted by 
sampling probabilities. – SD: Standard deviation of the TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test score. – Books at home: 
share of students in each category, weighted by sampling probabilities. – 
a 1 = none or very few (0-10 books); 2 = enough to fill 
one shelf (11-25 books); 3 = enough to fill one bookcase (26-100 books); 4 = enough to fill two bookcases (101-200 books); 5 = 
enough to fill three or more bookcases (more than 200 books). – Mean category: mean of the books-at-home categories (1-5). – 
OECD member states marked in bold.   5
participated in both studies. Table 1 reports each country’s mean performance and standard 
deviation on this variable.  
In separate background questionnaires, students were asked to provide information on 
various features of their family background. These features include the number of books in 
their home (see next sub-section for details), whether they themselves, their mother and their 
father were born in the country, their family status (living together with both parents or not), 
their gender and age. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on these variables for the 
international dataset.5  
2.1.2 The Family-Background Proxy 
The proxy for the family background of students that we use in our study is the number of 
books in the students’ home. “Books at home” is a measure of family background proposed 
and frequently used in sociological research. A large number of books can be interpreted as 
an indicator for a family environment that highly esteems education and academic success 
and that will promote children’s academic effort (cf. Beaton et al. 1996; Mullis et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, the number of books at home proxies for the social background of the parents. It 
also proxies for their economic background, since books are goods that have to be paid for. 
Thus, the variable “books at home” provides a proxy for the educational, social and economic 
background of the students’ families.  
In both TIMSS tests, the number of books at home was reported by the students 
themselves in the student background questionnaire according to the following question: 
“About how many books are there in your home? (Do not count magazines, newspapers, or 
your school books.)” The following five answer categories were given: 1 – “none or very few 
(0-10 books)”; 2 – “enough to fill one shelf (11-25 books)”; 3 – “enough to fill one bookcase 
(26-100 books)”; 4 – “enough to fill two bookcases (101-200 books)”; 5 – “enough to fill 
three or more bookcases (more than 200 books)”. Table 1 reports the frequency with which 
each category was answered in each country.  
An obvious alternative to the books-at-home proxy would be to use parental education as a 
proxy for family background.6 However, we view the books-at-home proxy as preferable for 
                                                 
5 The small number of observations with missing data on these variables was dropped from the estimations 
in this paper.  
6 Other family-background proxies used in sociological research include parental occupation and indices of 
socio-economic status, usually also based on occupational status. For example, one widely used index is some 
form of the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which derives from a classification of occupational 
status by Ganzeboom et al. (1992). Their mapping from occupational to socio-economic status is based on only  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the International Data 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum Maximum Number of 
countries 
Books at home (1-5)  3.2 1.3 1  5  54 
Student age
a  14.3 0.8 13 17.3 54 
Female student  0.499 0  1  54 
Living with both parents  0.838 0  1  51 
Student born in country  0.938 0  1  52 
Mother born in country  0.892 0  1  53 
Father born in country  0.886 0  1  53 
Age of first tracking  15.2 2.5 10 19 54 
Pre-school enrollment  60.1 29.4 5.1 115.9 53 
Pre-school duration  2.7 1.0 1 4  53 
Educational expenditure per student  4380.7 3874.9 189 14270.4  50 
GNI per capita  14584.2 8020.8 1300 33160  53 
Private enrollment share  15.1 20.0 0 77.5  43 
Private expenditure share  13.7 11.5 1.2 44.9 32 
Full-day schooling  0.559 0 1  34 
Start of primary education  6.2 0.5 5 7  53 
Notes: Mean: International mean, weighted by sampling probabilities. – Standard deviation: International 
standard deviation (only for discrete variables). – 
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several reasons. First, previous results based on the TIMSS as well as on the PISA 2000 
dataset have shown that, on average, books at home are the single most important predictor of 
student performance, considerably stronger than parental education (see Wößmann 2003, 
2004 for TIMSS; Fuchs and Wößmann 2004 for PISA).7 Second, even when the parents’ level 
of education is reported using international standards such as the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED), specific educational tracks differ considerably across 
countries. Thus, a given level of education does not imply the same knowledge in all 
countries, so that the cross-country comparability may be limited. In terms of mere units of 
measurement, the cross-country comparability of counting books at home is much more 
straightforward. Third, there is a TIMSS-specific data problem, since parental education is 
measured slightly differently in TIMSS-95 and TIMSS-Repeat (due to an interim adjustment 
of the ISCED classification), while the scaling of the books at home variable remained 
exactly the same. Finally, there is also a second, more general data problem, insofar as 
substantially more observations are missing for the parental education variable than for the 
books-at-home variable. E.g., about one third of the observations on parental education in the 
Western European countries are missing in the TIMSS dataset, while the average fraction of 
missing observations of the books-at-home variable in the same countries is less than three 
percent (cf. Wößmann 2004).  
Despite these relative advantages of the books-at-home proxy, it is still only a proxy for 
family background and has, therefore, its limitations. In particular, although it is reasonable to 
assume that the socio-economic position of a family is positively correlated with the number 
of books it owns, it is possible that this correlation varies across countries with different 
cultures’ differing appreciation of books. The extent to which this is the case, and the extent 
to which this might bias the results reported in this study, is a priori unclear. We do not know 
of any study that has tried to validate the cross-cultural comparability of the number of books 
at home as a family-background proxy.8  
                                                                                                                                                          
16 countries, however. The TIMSS studies do not provide data on parental occupation, and the cross-country 
comparability of occupational status may be more limited than that of books at home. 
7 Results on the PISA data, which contain information on the work status and occupation of parents, also 
reveal that books at home are on average a stronger predictor of student performance than parental work status 
and occupation (Fuchs and Wößmann 2004). The PISA data also show that there are more missing observations 
on the occupation variable than on the books-at-home variable.  
8 When experimenting with the parental-education measure as an alternative measure for socio-economic 
background, we found that the general pattern of results does look quite similar, although there are sizable 
differences for a few countries.   7
Taking these caveats into account, we suggest the following procedure to test for the cross-
country validity of the books-at-home variable. We are aware of one international student 
achievement test which provides data on both books at home and household income (which 
unfortunately has much fewer participating countries than the pooled TIMSS tests). This is 
the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), also conducted by the IEA, 
that tested fourth-grade students in 2001 (data released in 2003). PIRLS contained a home 
background questionnaire, completed by the parents of tested students, which asked both 
about the before-tax annual household income (in six bracketed categories) and about the 
number of books in their home (in five categories, in exactly the same way as in TIMSS). In a 
sense, household income may be viewed as the “ideal” measure of family background, at least 
from an economic perspective. Given this dataset containing both income and books 
information, we can test whether the correlation between household income and books at 
home varies across countries. Unfortunately, there are only six OECD countries for which 
PIRLS provides income data in a comparable way (England, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the Slovak Republic and Sweden).  
When we regress the categorically measured income variable on the books-at-home 
categorical variable, country dummies and interactions between books at home and the 
country dummies, none of the interactions is statistically or quantitatively significant. This is 
despite the fact that the coefficient on books at home is statistically and quantitatively highly 
significant: Given that the six-country sample contains 20,343 students, the effect is very 
precisely estimated, at 0.528 with a standard deviation of only 0.009 (t-statistic: 61.0). While 
this means that the 95-percent confidence interval ranges only from 0.511 to 0.545, still none 
of the country interactions is statistically significant, with their size varying only from -0.048 
to 0.045. That is, the association between household income and books at home does not vary 
significantly between the countries. We view this as strong evidence in favor of the validity of 
cross-country comparisons where the books-at-home variable proxies for family background.  
2.2  The Empirical Specification 
To estimate the extent of equality of educational opportunity achieved in country j, we regress 
the test performance of individual students on our proxy for family background, i.e. the 
number of books at home, and a set of control variables, separately for each country j:  
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where Tisj is test score of student i in school s in country j and Bisj is our measure of books in 
the individual student’s home. The set of control variables includes: a constant αj, student age 
Aisj, student gender Gisj, a dummy for family composition Fisj indicating whether the student 
lives together with both parents and, for the countries participating in both TIMSS studies, a 
study dummy Sisj. Furthermore, the regressions control for three immigration status dummies, 
indicating whether the student (
i
isj I ), the mother (
m
isj I ) and the father (
f
isj I ) were born in the 
country, respectively. Finally, the regressions control for interaction terms between these 
three immigration dummies and books at home.  isj ε  is the error term.  
In the following, we first discuss the functional form of the relation between test scores 
and books at home, which will be followed by a discussion of the inclusion of control 
variables in general and the immigration controls in particular, as well as of the specific 
structure of the error term.  
We enter the books-at-home variable Bisj as a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 
according to the five answer categories reported in Section 2.1.2 above. This approach is 
valid under the assumption that the performance differences of students between each of these 
categories are roughly the same. Specification tests suggest that this is a valid assumption, as 
the suggested functional form represents the data particularly well. That is, we initially 
estimated a form of equation (1) for the pooled sample of all countries (controlling for 
country fixed effects) in which we entered four dummies to represent the five available 
books-at-home categories individually (leaving the lowest one out as the residual category). 
This estimation does not place any restrictions on the functional form, as it uses all 
information available and allows the effect of books to vary in any possible way. The 
estimated coefficients on the four dummies showed a highly linear pattern. That is, when 
forcing the four steps to have equal length by applying the mean of the implied steps between 
the five categories (which was equal to 17.7) to each step, which implies the four linear steps 
of 17.7, 35.5, 53.2 and 71.0, these implied linear steps are very close to the actual estimates 
on the four dummies of 14.4, 38.4, 58.6 and 71.0. They all either fall within the 99% 
confidence interval of the four directly estimated individual dummies or are very close to the 
bounds of these intervals.9 Thus, the linear functional form taking on values from 1 to 5 along 
the lines of the five answer categories reproduces the data considerably well. 
                                                 
9 The two deviations where the implied steps do not fall within the confidence intervals are that the first 
implied step of 17.7 is slightly above the upper bound of 17.1 of the 99% confidence interval of the direct   9
The official TIMSS publications report simple (bivariate) comparisons of the average 
performance of students falling into different categories on a specific family-background 
variable (cf. Beaton et al. 1996; Mullis et al. 2000). However, such bivariate comparisons can 
easily be confounded by other basic characteristics of the students, such as age, gender, 
family composition and immigration status. Thus, our regressions include controls for these 
potentially confounding factors, thereby holding these factors constant when comparing the 
performance of students along the books-at-home dimension.  
One particular criticism often raised against international comparisons of measures of 
dispersion in student achievements and the bivariate estimates of family-background effects 
(FBEs) is that countries have different immigrant populations. There are two reasons why 
immigrant populations may cause a bias in these bivariate estimates. First, if immigration 
status and family background (as proxied by books at home in our study) are correlated, 
international differences in estimated FBEs are biased when ignoring the immigration status. 
Second, the FBEs may be heterogeneous between native and immigrated families, which may 
introduce an additional bias to the cross-country pattern of estimated FBEs. Since we do not 
want our estimator of the strength of the influence of family background on student 
performance to be affected by the proportion of immigrant students in the respective 
countries, we calculate the FBEs net of immigration status. That is, we control for these 
potentially biasing effects already in the micro construction of our FBE measure. The three 
dummies for the immigration status of students, their mothers and their fathers ensure that the 
first possible cause for a bias does not affect our FBEs. The interaction terms between the 
three immigration dummies and our family-background measure ensure that the second 
possible case does bias our FBEs. Thus, our estimated FBEs represent only the family-
background influence of the native students in each country, which seems to be the best way 
to provide cross-country comparability despite cross-country differences in the immigrant 
population.10  
Under the assumption that any factors which are not controlled for by the included 
explanatory variables, and which therefore enter the error term, are not systematically related 
to the number of books in the students’ home, least-squares estimation of equation (1) yields 
                                                                                                                                                          
estimate on the first dummy, and that the third implied step of 53.2 is slightly below the lower bound of 55.3 of 
the 99% confidence interval of the direct estimate on the third dummy.  
10 One way in which the size of the immigrant population could still affect our FBEs is if the size of the FBE 
among native students is affected, for example, by how many immigrants are in their specific class.    10
an estimate of the influence of family background (as proxied by books at home) on student 
performance.  
In estimating the error term εisj of equation (1), it has to be recognized that the performance 
of students within the same school may not be independent from one another (cf. Moulton 
1986 for this problem of hierarchical data structure). Furthermore, the TIMSS sampling 
procedure had a two-stage clustered sampling design within each country (cf. Martin and 
Kelly 1996; Martin et al. 2000). At the first stage, schools were sampled, and at the second 
stage classrooms were sampled within these schools. Thus, the primary sampling unit (PSU) 
in TIMSS was the school. This suggests that the independence assumption usually made with 
respect to individual observations in standard econometric methods should be relaxed in favor 
of the assumption that only the variation between schools (PSUs) provides independent 
variation. This is implemented by the clustering-robust linear regression (CRLR) method, 
which allows any given amount of correlation of the error terms within PSUs and requires 
only that observations be independent across PSUs (cf. White 1984; Deaton 1997). 
Since TIMSS used a stratified sampling design within each country, sampling probabilities 
vary for different students (Martin and Kelly 1996; Martin et al. 2000). We obtain nationally 
representative coefficient estimates by employing weighted least squares (WLS) regressions, 
using the sampling probabilities as weights. WLS estimation guarantees that the proportional 
contribution to the parameter estimates of each stratum in the sample is the same as if a 
complete census had been obtained (cf. DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Wooldridge 2001).  
2.3  Results on the Family-Background Effects (FBEs) 
Our estimates of the family-background effect (FBE) in the 54 countries, estimated as βj in 
equation (1), are reported in Table 3. The results suggest that in all countries student 
performance is influenced in a statistically significant way by our family-background 
variable.11 The size of the estimated FBEs indicates how much students’ test scores differ on 
average between the five categories of the variable “books at home” reported in Section 2.1.2. 
Since the performance of students was measured by standardized test scores with an 
international standard deviation of 100, the coefficients can be interpreted as percentages of 
                                                 
11 The sole exception is Kuwait, whose estimate is not significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels of statistical significance, but only at 14 percent. The estimate in Colombia is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level, while the estimates in all other countries reach statistical significance at the 1 percent level.   
Table 3: Family-Background Effects (FBEs)  
as an Index of Inequality of Educational Opportunity 
   FBE  Std.  Err. Year(s)  Observations
1  England  28.81  (1.70) 1995 + 1999  4,388 
2  Taiwan (Chinese Taipei)  27.91  (1.31) 1999 5,711 
3  Scotland  26.95  (1.70) 1995 2,608 
4  Hungary  25.84  (1.29) 1995 + 1999  5,727 
5  Germany  25.57  (1.94) 1995 2,698 
6  Korea  24.75  (0.81) 1995 + 1999  8,897 
7 Macedonia  24.05  (2.35) 1999 3,683 
8  Slovak Rep.  24.01  (1.26) 1995 + 1999  6,823 
9 Bulgaria  23.32  (2.94) 1999 3,107 
10  United States  23.13  (0.81) 1995 + 1999  14,877 
11 Lithuania  23.09  (1.32) 1995 + 1999  4,749 
12  Ireland  23.04  (1.98) 1995 2,989 
13  New Zealand  22.80  (1.40) 1995 + 1999  6,974 
14  Czech Rep.  22.45  (1.67) 1995 + 1999  6,604 
15 Slovenia  22.25  (1.51) 1995 + 1999  5,676 
16 Malaysia  22.18  (2.06) 1999 5,524 
17 South  Africa  22.05  (2.67) 1995 + 1999  10,307 
18 Chile  21.95  (1.78) 1999 5,507 
19  Australia  21.45  (1.43) 1995 + 1999  10,454 
20  Sweden  21.24  (1.59) 1995 3,925 
21  Austria  20.80  (1.68) 1995 2,632 
22 Russian  Fed.  20.27  (1.78) 1995 + 1999  7,941 
23  Norway  20.00  (1.68) 1995 3,196 
24 Romania  19.68  (2.09) 1995 + 1999  6,748 
25  Greece  19.22  (1.63) 1995 3,898 
26 Israel  18.84  (2.17) 1995 + 1999  4,965 
27 Singapore  18.54  (1.82) 1995 + 1999  9,518 
28 Jordan  17.92  (2.40) 1999 4,402 
29  Italy  17.51  (1.42) 1999 3,300 
30  Netherlands  17.03  (2.08) 1995 + 1999  4,729 
31  Belgium (French)  16.77  (1.77) 1995 2,477 
32  Switzerland  16.77  (1.62) 1995 4,720 
33 Latvia  16.65  (1.26) 1995 + 1999  4,939 
34 Philippines  16.53  (2.09) 1995 + 1999  11,693 
35 Moldova  15.80  (2.01) 1999 3,342 
36  Spain  15.26  (1.06) 1995 3,752 
37  Denmark  15.08  (1.62) 1995 2,155 
38 Cyprus  14.21  (0.89) 1995 + 1999  5,680 
39  Finland  13.98  (1.51) 1999 2,828 
40  Japan  13.50  (1.13) 1999
a 4,608 
41 Thailand  12.37  (1.60) 1995 + 1999  11,211 
42  Turkey  11.77  (1.35) 1999 7,393 
43  Iceland  11.42  (2.55) 1995 1,728 
44 Iran  11.25  (0.93) 1995 + 1999  7,231 
45  Belgium (Flemish)  10.95  (1.11) 1995 + 1999  7,657 
46 Hong  Kong  10.82  (1.28) 1995 + 1999  7,984 
47  Portugal  10.40  (1.05) 1995 3,335 
48  Canada  9.76  (0.95) 1995 + 1999  16,101 
49  France  8.32  (1.44) 1995 2,770 
50 Colombia  7.55  (3.84) 1995 2,455 
51 Morocco  6.84  (2.02) 1999 2,383 
52 Tunisia  6.32  (0.72) 1999 4,758 
53 Indonesia  4.83  (1.81) 1999 5,538 
54 Kuwait  2.49  (1.59) 1995 1,442 
Notes: Coefficient estimate on books at home. – Dependent variable: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test 
score (mean of math and science). – Regressions control for: student age, student gender, family status, student born 
in country, mother born in country, father born in country, interactions between the three immigration variables and 
books, a TIMSS-Repeat dummy and a constant. – Regressions weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. – 
Clustering-robust standard errors (taking account of correlated error terms within schools) in parentheses. – 
a Japan 
also participated in 1995, but the question on books at home was not administered at an internationally comparable 
scale. – OECD member states marked in bold. – All estimates are statistically significantly different from zero at the 
1 percent level, with the exceptions of Colombia (5 percent level) and Kuwait (14 percent level).   11
an international standard deviation by which test achievement increases when raising the 
number of books at home by one category.12  
In interpreting the estimated FBEs, first recall that initial evidence showed that each move 
from one books-at-home category to the next can be regarded as roughly equivalent in terms 
of its effect on test scores. The FBEs reported in Table 3 show by how much one of these 
steps changes the test scores in each country. Consider as an example the estimated FBE for 
the United States of 23.1. A 1-point difference in the family-background proxy – e.g., the 
difference in social background of US students that is equivalent to the difference between 
having one bookcase and two bookcases of books at home – goes hand in hand with a 
difference of 23.1 percent of an international standard deviation in test scores.  
With an FBE of 23.1, the United States falls in the top quarter of the most unequal 
countries – both in the overall sample and in the OECD sub-sample. As the results of Table 3 
show, England (28.8), Taiwan (27.9), Scotland (27.0), Hungary (25.8) and Germany (25.6) 
are the five countries with the largest estimated FBE in our sample of 54 countries. That is, 
they provide their students with the least equality of educational opportunity. On average, the 
impact of family background on student performance in these five countries is more than four 
times as large as in the countries with the smallest performance difference for students from 
different family backgrounds, Kuwait (2.5), Indonesia (4.8), Tunisia (6.3), Morocco (6.8) and 
Colombia (7.6). Their particularly low FBEs may be partly due to the fact that the average 
performance level of these countries is relatively low, so that the performance of all students 
is condensed at a rather low level. When looking at the more homogeneous sample of OECD 
countries, the countries that provide the largest extent of equality of educational opportunity 
to students from different family background are France (8.3), Canada (9.8), Portugal (10.4) 
and the Flemish school system in Belgium (11.0).  
In sum, the estimated FBEs presented in Table 3 constitute a cross-country index of the 
inequality of educational opportunity that the different school systems achieve for students 
from different family backgrounds, where a high FBE value is associated with low equality of 
educational opportunity. The results show that there is substantial variation across countries 
in the extent to which equality of educational opportunity is achieved.  
                                                 
12 As France and Japan did not collect information on the immigration status of the parents, and France also 
not for the student, their estimated FBEs do not control for these variables.   12
3.  School Systems and Equality of Opportunity: A Theoretical Model 
Given the cross-country variation in equality of educational opportunity revealed in the 
previous section, we analyze in the remaining two sections how this variation relates to 
features of the different school systems. To this end, we first develop a theoretical model of 
how key features of school systems affect equality of opportunity. In the next section, we then 
test the predictions of the model empirically. 
3.1  Pre-School Enrollment and Duration 
To shed some light on the complex relationship between the adopted school system and the 
effect of family background on educational achievement (the FBE), we focus on the main 
features that characterize school systems: the number of years children attend pre-school, the 
fraction of children attending pre-school and the age at which students are tracked into 
different schools according to ability. Since we attempt to identify the determinants of the 
FBE, we assume only one kind of heterogeneity, namely the students’ family background that 
encompasses in particular family income, the parents’ education and the parents’ appreciation 
of formal education. 
We assume that family background can be expressed by a real-numbered indicator f that is 
uniformly distributed over the support [f0,f1]. The empirical literature on pre-school 
enrollment demonstrates that enrollment varies positively with family income and the parents’ 
education, the reason being that formal day care centers may be more expensive than the 
informal alternatives and that well-educated parents value the human capital (cognitive skills 
and non-cognitive behavioral patterns) acquired in formal pre-school settings more than less 
educated parents (see, for example, the brief literature survey in Chiswick and DebBurman 
2004). We do not explicitly model the parents’ straightforward pre-school enrollment 
decision but focus on the special learning environment of formal pre-schools that is 
characterized by marked peer-group effects (see, for example, Feinstein et al. 1999). Thus 
enrollment E, measured as the fraction of children of the respective age group enrolled in 
formal pre-schools, implies that all children with a family background 
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attend pre-school, and children with an inferior family background do not. 
Given this enrollment pattern, average pre-school peer quality q amounts to:    13
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Denoting the duration of pre-schooling by K, we assume that human capital formation in 
pre-school varies positively with q and K. Allowing for decreasing returns in pre-school years 
K, the pre-school production function may be written as αqK
β, where α and β are positive 
parameters and β is in the unit interval. Human capital accumulation up to the mandatory 
school age is of course also directly influenced by the family background; after all, before 
attending pre-school, children spend most of their prime time at home and are therefore 
exposed to the family environment (cf. Feinstein et al. 1999). Denoting the beginning of the 
mandatory school age by k, we assume a linear relationship between family background and 
human capital acquisition at home amounting to (k–K)fi.  
Before being admitted to school, a child with family background fi has therefore 
accumulated the human capital:  
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Since pre-schooling operates with decreasing returns, whereas human capital accumulation 
at home is linear in time, it is possible that children acquire less human capital H
K if they are 
sent to pre-school for too long a time. To avoid this pre-school trap that would apply 
especially to children with favorable family backgrounds, we assume that all children 
(including the ones with the most favorable family background f1) profit from attending pre-
school even if pre-schools offer the worst possible peer-group environment (E=1), i.e. we 
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Figure 1 depicts how much human capital H
K children accumulate before they are admitted 
to school. Children with favorable family backgrounds are advantaged for two reasons: they 
profit from a better home environment that allows them to accumulate a higher  (0 )
K
i HK = , 
and they are sent to formal pre-school which, via assumption (A1), we assume to provide all 
children with an additional head start.  
Marked FBEs on human capital accumulation thus can already be observed at the pre-
school level. Since the family background fi impacts in a non-linear manner on human capital  
Figure 1: Family Background and Human Capital Accumulation 
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formation, the FBE varies across family backgrounds. If one wants to work with a real-valued 
indicator capturing the FBE across all children, one therefore needs to resort to some kind of 
meaningful ad hoc measure. Employing the often used difference between the top and bottom 
quintile, we base our analysis of the pre-school period on the measure 
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where  K
z H  denotes the human capital accumulated by a child with family background 
10 (1 ) zz f z f =+ − . 
Using the above definition of H
K one immediately arrives at  
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This indicator of pre-school FBEs depends in particular on the duration of formal pre-
schooling K and enrollment E. If the children indicated by z=1/5 are enrolled in pre-school 
(E>4/5), then an increase in the duration of pre-schooling K gives rise to a decrease in ∆H
K 
because the children are more and more exposed to the same learning environment. If the 
children indicated by z=1/5 are not enrolled but the children indicated by z=4/5 are, i.e. if 
[ ) 1/5,4/5 E∈ , then ∆H
K only decreases in K if K is sufficiently large for the decreasing pre-
school returns to kick in. Differentiating the middle term in the above ∆H
K function with 
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Adopting assumption (A2), the pre-school FBE as measured by ∆H
K  depends on 
enrollment E as depicted in Figure 2. In the following it will be shown that the implied non-
linear relationship is preserved with minor qualifications all the way through mandatory 
schooling. 
3.2  Ability Tracking in the School System 
Mandatory schooling lasts for S years. The school system may track children according to 
ability (which in our model is equal to accumulated human capital) for the last T≤ S years. As  
Figure 2: Pre-School Enrollment and the Family-Background Effect: Theory 
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long as the students are not tracked, they attend for C=S–T years a “comprehensive” school in 
which all students are exposed to the same peer group environment. Even though the quality 
of this encompassing peer group environment depends of course on the pre-school experience 
of the student body, we do not explicitly relate this general peer-group effect to the variables 
E and K that characterize the pre-school human capital accumulation process. We do however 
allow for a specific FBE that captures the help school children may obtain from their parents. 
The associated benefit depends on how much parental help Fi (for example, in terms of time) 
the individual student obtains and on the quality of the help as measured by the family 
background variable fi. The following production function of the comprehensive school 
portrays how duration of schooling, family help and pre-acquired human capital translate into 
human capital H
C at the end of comprehensive schooling: 
  ()
CK
ii i i HF f C H γ =+ +  .  (7) 
After comprehensive schooling, we envisage a two-tiered school system with a high track 
accommodating the top t percent of the children (measured according to human capital H
C) 
and a low track for the remaining students. The high-track school provides the students with 
more human capital than the low-track school, be it because of a more challenging curriculum 
or because production profits from a more favorable composition of peers, or both. In any 
case, we again do not relate possible general peer-group effects to the variables E, K and C 
describing the students’ history, but rather use a parametric specification capturing the main 
thrust of the argument: 
  ()
TC
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where j denotes either the high-track school (h) or the low-rack school (l), with δh>δl. 
In determining the endogenous parental input Fi at the comprehensive school level, we 
assume that parents derive utility only from the publicly revealed success of their children’s 
scholastic experience, i.e. the respective utility gain derives from their children being 
admitted to the high-track school. We thus focus on status considerations and not on truly 
altruistic motives associated with academic development. The parents’ utility function has the 
following appearance: 
  2
j i UT C F =−  ,     j=l,h (9) 
where Th (Tl) denotes the parents’ valuation of the high (low) track school. Notice that we 
assume increasing marginal cost in the help provided in terms of the duration of   16
comprehensive schooling, thereby portraying increasing parental frustration over the long 
haul. The maximum parental input Fi of an fi-parent is supplied if this parent is indifferent 
between providing Fi (and thereby managing her child to be admitted to the high-track 
school) and not providing any effort with the consequence that her child has to attend the low-
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The maximum increase in accumulation of human capital H
C attributable to parental input 
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Figure 1 depicts the students’ increase in human capital attributable to comprehensive 
schooling, i.e. γC, as well as the maximum additional increase attributable to parental input, 
resulting in the human capital 
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as the case may be.  
We are now in a position to derive the utility maximizing parental input Fi. To begin with, 
assume that none of the students obtain any parental help. Then the students with the lowest 
stock of H
C,0 who are admitted to the high-track school have the family background ft (since 
the top t percent are admitted). Under these circumstances, the parents of the students with 
family backgrounds just a little less favorable than ft would have an incentive to provide their 
children with help in order to let them jump over their slightly better qualified school mates. 
Anticipating this behavior, all parents of students who are in danger of being passed by school 
mates with less favorable family backgrounds will provide help up to the extent that will deter 
the parents of the less favored school mates to follow through with their help scheme.  
In equilibrium, all students with a family background fi>ft and an anticipated human 







++  will obtain parental help to 
                                                 
13 The parental-help effect could also be interpreted as an incentive effect on the part of the student. From a 
formal point of view, the two effects are isomorphic. For reasons deriving from introspection we believe 
however the parental-help interpretation to convey a more realistic portrait of the human capital accumulation 
process of youths. 
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such an extent that they reach exactly the latter critical level. Tracking has therefore two 
consequences that favor students with favorable family backgrounds: first, they are admitted 
to the high track schools that offer a better education, and second, they may profit from extra 
parental help. All these effects are portrayed in Figure 1. 
The human capital stock accumulated by the end of the mandatory school age can thus be 
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Employing the quintile-difference approach to measuring the FBE at the end of mandatory 
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3.3 Numerical  Solution 
To avoid a straightforward but cumbersome discussion of the properties of the function 
FBE(K,E,C), we resort to presenting in Table 4 some numerical examples that provide the 
general picture.  
The non-bracketed entries in Table 4 apply if the parents derive a sizeable utility gain from 
their children’s attending the high-track school (∆T=6). The bracketed entries show how the 
FBEs change if the parents do not derive any such utility gain (∆T=0). If pre-school 
enrollment  E is lower than 20%, neither the f4/5-children nor the f1/5-children attend pre-
school; our measure of the FBE which is based on the scholastic achievement of these 
children then does not depend on how long the few advantaged enrolled children attend pre-
school. If however enrollment reaches 20%, so that at least the f4/5-children attend pre-school, 
the duration K of pre-schooling varies negatively with the FBE, i.e. more years of pre- 
Table 4: Numerical Examples of the Predicted Family-Background Effect 
   E=15%  E=30%  E=45%  E=60%  E=75%  E=90% 
K=1.25  6.55 (6.10)  7.99  7.82  8.48 (7.65)  8.31 (7.48)  6.17 (5.34) 
K=1.5  6.55 (6.10)  7.93  7.75  8.46 (7.56)  8.28 (7.38)  6.10 (5.20) 
K=1.75  6.55 (6.10)  7.84  7.65  8.42 (7.45)  8.22 (7.25)  6.02 (5.05) 
K=2.0  6.55 (6.10)  7.73  7.52  8.36 (7.31)  8.15 (7.10)  5.95 (4.90) 
C=4 
K=2.25  6.55 (6.10)  7.60  7.37  8.27 (7.15)  8.05 (6.92)  5.87 (4.75) 
K=1.25  5.10  6.99  6.82  6.73 (6.65)  6.56 (6.48)  4.42 (4.35) 
K=1.5  5.10  6.93  6.75  6.71 (6.56)  6.53 (6.38)  4.35 (4.20) 
K=1.75  5.10  6.84  6.65  6.67 (6.45)  6.47 (6.25)  4.27 (4.05) 
K=2.0  5.10  6.73  6.52  6.61 (6.31)  6.49 (6.10)  4.20 (3.90) 
C=6 
K=2.25  5.10  6.60  6.37  6.52 (6.15)  6.30 (5.92)  4.12 (3.75) 
K=1.25  4.10  5.99  5.82  5.65 5.48 3.35 
K=1.5  4.10  5.93  5.75  5.56 5.38 3.20 
K=1.75  4.10  5.84  5.65  5.45 5.25 3.05 
K=2.0  4.10  5.73  5.52  5.30 5.10 2.90 
C=8 
K=2.25  4.10  5.60  5.37  5.15 4.92 2.75 
Notes: Family-background effect FBE = FBE(K,E,C), where K = pre-school duration, E = pre-school enrollment 
and C = number of comprehensive school years. t = 0.5, ∆T = 6 (0), S = 9, δl = 3/4, δh = 5/4, α = 2, β = 1/2, γ = 1, 
k = 6, f0 = 1, f1 = 2.    18
schooling increase equality of opportunity. The reason is that the educational experience of all 
pre-school children becomes more uniform. 
Just as clear-cut is the influence of the timing of segregation as measured by the number C 
of comprehensive school years. The longer children are educated together, the smaller is the 
FBE, i.e. comprehensive schooling increases equality of opportunity. One reason is again that 
comprehensive schools simply provide a uniform educational environment for all children. In 
addition, however, the parents’ educational input becomes more costly as C increases and is 
therefore reduced; since parental help has an asymmetric influence in the sense that it benefits 
mainly children with a favorable family background, this second effect reinforces the first 
one. If pre-school enrollment encompasses E=60% of the children of the respective age group 
and pre-schooling lasts for 15 months (K=1.25), then, if tracking after four years of 
comprehensive schooling (C=4) is postponed to the end of the sixth year (C=6), the FBE 
drops from 8.48 to 6.73. This decrease of 1.75 can be decomposed in a reduction of 1.00 
(7.65-6.65) attributable to the increase in comprehensive schooling, and in an additional 
reduction of 0.75 ((8.48-7.65)-(6.73-6.65)) attributable to the reduction in parental help. 
The influence of pre-school enrollment E on the FBE is somewhat more complex. 
Consider, for example, the first row in Table 4 (C=4, K=1.25). If only 15% of the children are 
enrolled in pre-school, the FBE amounts to 6.55. Since the crucial f4/5-children do not attend 
pre-school, their human capital H
C is not much higher than that of f1/2-children, implying that 
their parents will provide them with help in order to make sure that they eventually are 
admitted to the prestigious high-track school. This parental input generates an increase of the 
FBE by 0.45 (without parental help it would be 6.10). An increase in pre-school enrollment to 
E=30% increases the FBE to 7.99. This increase is attributable to the fact that now the f4/5-
children do attend pre-school and therefore have a much higher human capital at the 
beginning of schooling. Notice that now, the f4/5-children do not profit anymore from parental 
help, because they are out of reach for the f1/2-children who still do not attend pre-school 
(other children, however, still obtain parental help, but this does not show up in our measure 
of the FBE). An increase in enrollment from E=30% to E=45% decreases the FBE because 
now the peer-group environment at pre-school becomes less favorable. A further increase of 
enrollment to E=60% causes the FBE to rise again even though the peer-group quality 
continues to decrease. The reason is that now the f1/2-children have begun to attend pre-school 
and therefore are again in a position to contest the sought-after slots at the high-track school, 
i.e. the parents of the f4/5-children provide again parental help which accounts for 0.83 (8.48-  19
7.65) of the FBE. An enrollment increase to E=75% slightly decreases the FBE because of the 
decrease in pre-school peer quality. But a much more significant drop in the FBE occurs 
when pre-school enrollment passes the 80% mark since then also the crucial f1/5-children 
attend pre-school, which closes the human capital gap between the two groups of children on 
which our indicator of the FBE is based. 
Our model thus illustrates the conduit through which the most important characteristics of 
the school system impact the FBE. Late tracking and a long pre-school education are 
beneficial for equality of opportunity, and pre-school enrollment has a detrimental influence 
at low levels of enrollment and a beneficial influence at higher levels. 
4.  School Systems and Equality of Opportunity: Empirical Evidence 
According to our model, equality of educational opportunity is better achieved in school 
systems with later tracking and longer pre-school cycles. Pre-school enrollment is predicted 
to have a non-linear relationship with equality of opportunity as measured by our FBE, which 
can best be described as an inverted U-shaped curve. Combining the FBEs estimated 
empirically in Section 2 with country-level data on pre-school and tracking systems, we can 
test the model predictions empirically. In addition, we will test whether the relationships 
prove robust when accounting for possible effects of other features of education policies. The 
results provide answers to the question of why it is that some countries achieve much higher 
equality of educational opportunity than others. 
4.1  The Empirical Specifications 
There are two ways to identify how systemic features are related to the FBE. First, we can use 
the estimated country-level FBEs reported in Table 3 directly as left-hand-side variables in 
regressions on the different systemic features. Second, we can identify the relationship by 
interacting the country-level systemic features with the individual-level family-background 
measure in cross-country microeconometric regressions that use the test scores as their 
dependent variable. We will pursue both avenues of investigation.  
4.1.1 Country-Level Specification 
In the first specification, we use the FBEs estimated in Section 2.3 as the dependent variable 
in a country-level regression on several country-level systemic features; i.e., the FBE   20
estimators  βj of equation (1) are simply regressed on the set of potentially determining 
features Zj of the school systems:  
  j j j Z µ θ λ β + + =  .  (15) 
Since the dependent variable in this regression is the outcome of an estimation procedure 
rather than a precise observation, we have to account for the different standard errors with 
which the observations of the dependent variable are estimated. The error term from an 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimation of equation (15) would be heteroscedastic with mean 
zero and a variance equal to the sum of the variance of the actual error term and the variance 
of the estimated FBE. We use the weighted estimation procedure proposed by Anderson 
(1993) which down-weights observations whose FBEs were relatively imprecisely measured: 
First, we compute the squared residuals of an OLS regression of equation (15). We then run a 
second regression of these squared residuals on the estimated variances of the FBEs, the 
variances squared and the variances cubed. The fitted values of this regression specify to what 
extend the squared residuals of the first regression can be explained by the variance of the 
FBE estimates. Finally, we use the inverse of these fitted values as weights in a WLS 
regression of equation (15), thereby giving lower weight to imprecisely estimated FBE 
observations.  
4.1.2 Student-Level Interaction Specifications 
The country-level specification provides a rather ad-hoc partition of the estimation in two 
steps: in a first step, equation (1) is estimated using micro data within each country, and a 
second step then uses the resulting coefficient estimates in the country-level estimation of 
equation (15). This two-step estimation procedure places rather strong restrictions on the joint 
distribution of the variables used in the two different equations. We can relax these 
restrictions by pooling the micro data across countries and combining them with the 
additional system-level data. In this second set of specifications, the relationship between the 
country-level systemic features and the effect of family background on student performance 
can be identified by the interaction between the country-level features and the family-
background measure in a student-level cross-country regression that has the individual test 
scores as its dependent variable.  
The first of these student-level interaction specifications assumes that after having 
controlled for the observed systemic and individual effects, there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity left across countries which might bias the estimates. Under this assumption, the   21
estimated coefficients η on the interaction terms between our family-background proxy Bisj 
(books at home, measured at the student level) and the vector of systemic features Zj 
(measured at the country level) identify how the systemic features affect the FBE:  
  ( ) isj isj j isj j isj isj X Z B Z B T ϖ γ η ρ β α + + + + + =  , (16) 
where Xisj is a vector combining all the (student-level) control variables of equation (1).  
This specification does not only identify how the FBEs relate to the systemic features, but 
also the main effects of the systemic features on student test scores. However, the estimates of 
these main systemic effects in equation (16) will only be unbiased if there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity in the performance levels across the countries. Thus, this first student-level 
interaction specification still requires the assumption that there is no unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity in student performance. 
We can relax this assumption in a second student-level interaction specification that 
introduces a whole set of country fixed effects Cj, as well as interaction effects between all 
student-level controls Xisj and the country fixed effects:  
  ( ) ( ) isj isj isj j j j isj isj isj X X C C Z B B T ϖ γ δ δ η β α + + + + + + = 2 1  . (17) 
Due to the inclusion of country fixed effects, this specification can no longer identify the 
main systemic effects that work at the country level. But despite the country fixed effect, the 
specification still identifies our main measure of interest, namely how the systemic features 
affect the FBE. This influence is captured by the coefficients η on the interaction terms at the 
student level.  
For the identification of equation (17), the assumption of no unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity can be replaced by the less restrictive assumption that any unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity that may exist is unrelated to the size of the FBEs. Under this 
assumption, equation (17) can still identify how education policies relate to equality of 
educational opportunity. Since it requires the least restrictive assumptions on the cross-
country distribution of test scores, the student-level interaction specification with country 
fixed effects of equation (17) is our preferred specification. 
When estimating the student-level specifications of equations (16) and (17), one has to be 
aware that one part of the measures which identify our effect of interest, namely the systemic 
features of the school systems, are measured at the country level rather than the school level, 
since education policies are observed as system-level variables that vary across countries. 
Thus, the Moulton (1986) problem of a hierarchical data structure now applies at the country   22
rather than the school level, requiring a higher-level (country) error component to avoid 
spurious results. We therefore use countries as PSUs in the CRLR estimation of equations 
(16) and (17), allowing any given interdependence of the error variance-covariance matrix 
within countries and requiring only that the observations are independent across countries. 
This basically means that the standard errors are measured as if there were only as many 
observations as there are countries in the regression. Furthermore, in addition to the within-
country weighting of students according to their sampling weights (cf. Section 2.2 above), the 
observations are now weighted across countries such that each country in the sample has 
equal weight. 
4.2  Results on the Effect of Education Policy on Educational Inequality 
Country-level data on the different features of the school systems Z mainly come from 
statistical yearbooks and data collections by international organizations such as UNESCO and 
OECD, as well as detailed country-specific inquiries. Table A1 in the Appendix provides 
details on the definitions and sources of the different variables. The information was 
specifically collected for the years relevant for the students tested in the two TIMSS tests in 
1995 and 1999. Descriptive statistics of the data are contained in Table 2.  
We use the theoretical model of Section 3 as our baseline model for each of the three 
empirical specifications.14 The results of the country-level specification are reported in Table 
5, the student-level interaction specification with main systemic effects in Table 6 and the 
student-level interaction specification with country fixed effects in Table 7. The baseline 
model of each specification, reported in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Tables 5-7, includes the 
age of first tracking, enrollment in pre-school education and its square and the duration of 
pre-school education as potential determinants of the size of the FBE.  
The age at which students are first tracked into different school types that serve students 
according to their ability varies considerably across countries. While school tracking in many 
countries does not occur at all before the age of the students tested in TIMSS (roughly 14 
years), it occurs as early as age 10 in other countries. In line with the predictions of our 
model, later tracking is found to be statistically significantly negatively related to the FBEs in 
all three empirical specifications. That is, the earlier an education system tracks its students 
into different types of schools according to their ability, the more unequal are educational 
                                                 
14 Taiwan could not be included in any of the estimations due to lack of internationally comparable 
information on several school-system variables.  





























Educational expenditure per student /1000   
  -0.140
 
   
  (0.411)
 
GNI per capita /1000   
  -0.158
 
   
  (0.219)
 
Country mean test score /100   
  4.916
*** 
   
  (1.714)
 
Observations (countries)  53
   49
  
R
2 (adjusted)  0.400
   0.268
  
Notes: Dependent variable: estimated family-background effect (FBE) of Table 
3. – Regressions apply the Anderson (1993) weighted estimation procedure to 
account for estimated dependent variable. – Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance level: 
*** 1 percent. – 
* 10 percent. 
  
Table 6: Education Policy and Inequality of Opportunity:  




























Pre-school duration * books  -6.875
*** -8.141
***
   (1.977)
  (1.988)
 
Educational expenditure per student /1000 * books   
  0.277
 
   
  (0.702)
 






























Educational expenditure per student /1000   
  -2.372
 
   
  (4.045)
 
GNI per capita /1000   
  5.331
* 
   
  (2.702)
 
Observations (students)   295,026
   276,577
  





   0.243
  
Notes: Dependent variable: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test score (mean 
of math and science). – All regressions control for student age, student gender, family 
status, student born in country, mother born in country, father born in country, 
interactions between the three immigration variables and books, a TIMSS-Repeat 
dummy and a constant. – Regressions weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. – 
Clustering-robust standard errors (taking account of correlated error terms within 
countries) in parentheses.  
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 
percent. – 
* 10 percent.  
Table 7: Education Policy and Inequality of Opportunity:  




































































Private expenditure share * books   
   
  0.158
** 
   
   
  (0.060)
 
Private enrollment share * books   
   
  -0.099
*** 
   
   
  (0.031)
 
Observations (students)   295,026
   276,577
   156,412
  






   0.417
   0.294
  
Notes: Dependent variable: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test score (mean of math and science). 
– All regressions control for: country fixed effects, student age, student gender, family status, student born 
in country, mother born in country, father born in country, interactions between the three immigration 
variables and books, interactions between all these previous variables and country dummies and a constant. 
– Regressions weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. – Clustering-robust standard errors (taking 
account of correlated error terms within countries) in parentheses.  
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent. – 
* 10 percent.   23
opportunities. While the systemic effect is directly estimated in the country-level specification 
of Table 5, where the FBE is the dependent variable, the systemic effect in the two student-
level specifications is identified by the interaction effect. Under the assumption that there is 
no bias due to unobserved country heterogeneity, the student-level interaction specification 
with main systemic effects of Table 6 yields also estimates of the main effects of the systemic 
features on student performance. The results suggest that tracking does not exert a statistically 
significant direct effect on student performance.  
Table 7 reports the results of our preferred specification, which not only controls for a 
complete set of country fixed effects, but also for interaction effects between each of the 
student-level control variables and the complete set of country dummies, allowing the effects 
of the student-level controls to be country-specific. The size of the estimated interaction effect 
in column (5) suggests that for each additional year of earlier tracking, the estimated FBE 
(which has an international mean of 17.5 across all countries) increases by slightly more than 
one unit. Thus, a difference in the age of first tracking of four years is related to a difference 
in the FBE of an order of magnitude of roughly one quarter of the international mean of the 
whole FBE. The tracking effect is also directly observable in our estimated FBEs (Table 3). In 
our sample of countries, the education systems that track their students as early as age 10 – 
Austria (with an estimated FBE of 20.8), Germany (25.6), Hungary (25.8) and the Slovak 
Republic (24.0) – all show relatively large FBEs. By contrast, none of the OECD countries 
with relatively low FBEs – France (8.3), Canada (9.8) and Portugal (10.4) – track before an 
age of 15. The estimated tracking effect of column (5) in Table 7 suggests that roughly one 
third of the 14.5-point difference in the FBE between these two groups of countries can be 
attributed to their divergent tracking policies.  
In all three empirical specifications (Tables 5-7), the relationship between the FBE and the 
enrollment share in pre-school education follows a statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
pattern, again strongly in line with the theoretical model. That is, as long as only a relatively 
small part of the student population is enrolled in pre-school, enrollment is positively related 
to the FBE, which may be due to unequalizing effects of non-random sorting of better-off 
students into pre-school. Only when a substantial share of students is enrolled in pre-school, 
so that less well-off students are also enrolled, do we find an equalizing effect of pre-school 
enrollment. Figure 3 depicts this non-linear pattern graphically. Educational opportunities get 
more unequal with rising pre-school enrollment up to a maximum of 61 percent of pre-school 
enrollment. Only beyond this threshold is higher pre-school enrollment associated with more  












Note: Estimated interaction effect of books at home with pre-school enrollment and its square in the 
student-level interaction specification with country fixed effects reported in column (5) of Table 7.  
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equal educational opportunities. As is evident from the figure, moving from a low pre-school 
enrollment of 20 percent to a medium enrollment of 60 percent increases the estimated FBE 
by roughly 5 units. Moving from 60 percent enrollment to full enrollment decreases the 
estimated FBE by about the same amount.  
Also in line with the predictions of our model, we find that the official duration of pre-
school education is statistically significantly negatively related to the estimated FBEs in all 
three empirical specifications. A longer pre-school cycle is associated with lower inequality 
of educational opportunity. While pre-school enrollment – like tracking – does not show a 
statistically significant direct effect on student performance in the specification with main 
systemic effects of Table 6, meaning that these systemic features exert their impact on student 
performance only through an indirect effect via family background, the duration of the pre-
school cycle shows an additional statistically significant positive direct effect on the level of 
student performance.  
The predictions of our theoretical model are empirically borne out in all three empirical 
specifications: There is a negative relationship of the FBE with age of first tracking and pre-
school duration, and an inverted U-shaped relationship between FBE and pre-school 
enrollment. In the country-level model of Table 5, these features of the education system can 
together account for 40 percent of the cross-country variation in our estimated FBEs.  
To test for the robustness of these findings and check for other potentially important 
effects, we extend the baseline model to include additional explanatory variables in columns 
(2), (4) and (6) of Tables 5-7. In the first and third specification, neither educational 
expenditure per student nor the gross national income (GNI) per capita are statistically 
significantly related to the FBEs.15 The country-specific mean test-score performance, 
however, has a statistically significant and positive relationship with the FBEs.16 In the 
specification with main systemic effects of Table 6, the GNI per capita displays a marginally 
significant negative interaction with family background, as well as a marginally significant 
positive direct relationship with student performance. Most importantly, the results for the 
features of the baseline model remain qualitatively the same in the extended model.  
In column (7) of Table 7, we introduce two further systemic features of the education 
systems, namely the proportion of educational funds that stem from private sources and the 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the within-country variance in educational expenditure.  
16 To preserve the main-effects character of the specification of the first student-level specification, column 
(4) does not include the country mean test-score performance, as this would add aggregate values of the left-
hand-side variable to the right-hand side.    25
share of enrollment in private schools. While the number of available country observations 
drops to 27 in this specification, the results still show statistically significant relationships 
between the FBE and the share of the private sector in educational expenditure and 
enrollment. They suggest that the FBE increases with private expenditure and decreases with 
private enrollment. That is, education systems that rely on private funding show larger 
inequality of educational opportunity, but more private schooling provision relates to 
decreased inequality of opportunity.  
The results so far are based on samples that include all countries for which the data are 
available. To make sure that they are not driven by variations between very heterogeneous 
countries, Table 8 re-estimates the student-level interaction specification with country fixed 
effects for the more homogeneous sample of OECD countries. All substantive results prove 
robust in the OECD sample. The only exception is the effect of the country mean test score on 
the FBEs, which is now statistically insignificant and negative. That is, the tradeoff between 
equality of opportunity and a country’s mean performance apparent in the previous 
specifications does not survive the scrutiny of the OECD sample. Countries that achieve a 
higher degree of equality of educational opportunity do not seem to have to compromise on 
the average performance level of their student population.  
As a further robustness check, we drop France and Japan from our sample of countries, 
because they did not provide data on parental immigration status (and France also not on 
student immigration status), which might affect the relative size of their estimated FBEs.17 
Again, our results are not sensitive to this reduction in sample size (details available from the 
authors).  
We also experimented with two further systemic features of the education systems, namely 
half-day versus full-day schooling and the age at which compulsory education starts. A 
dummy for full-day schooling (available for 34 countries) is not statistically significantly 
related to the FBEs in any of our specifications. However, any effect of full-day schooling 
may be difficult to detect, since our data do not distinguish between countries that have 
afternoon classes and countries that only provide optional day care. The relationship between 
the FBE and the starting age of compulsory education proves very sensitive, mainly because 
                                                 
17 In Tables 6-8, the immigration dummies in the two countries were set to 1; in our preferred specification, 
any systematic effect that this constant imputation might have relative to other countries would be captured by 
the country fixed effects. 
   
Table 8: Education Policy and Inequality of Opportunity:  





































































Private expenditure share * books   
   
  0.169
** 
   
   
  (0.068)
 
Private enrollment share * books   
   
  -0.081
** 
   
   
  (0.030)
 
Observations (students)   154,243
   154,243
   125,775
  






   0.257
   0.260
  
Notes: Dependent variable: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat international test score (mean of math and 
science). – All regressions control for: country fixed effects, student age, student gender, family status, 
student born in country, mother born in country, father born in country, interactions between the three 
immigration variables and books, interactions between all these previous variables and country dummies 
and a constant. – Regressions weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. – Clustering-robust standard 
errors (taking account of correlated error terms within countries) in parentheses.  
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. – 
** 5 percent.  
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the starting age does not show much variation across countries (lying between 5 and 7 years) 
and because effects of pre-school enrollment and duration are already controlled for.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed an index of the inequality of educational opportunity in 54 
countries, based on estimates of the effect of family background on students’ educational 
performance. The family-background effects (FBEs) reveal substantial variation in the extent 
to which different countries achieve equality of educational opportunity for children from 
different family backgrounds. 
In order to explain how the family-background influence is related to systemic features of 
countries’ education systems, we presented a model that predicts that the earlier an education 
system tracks its students into different school types, the larger are the performance 
differences along the family-background dimension. The FBEs were predicted first to 
increase with enrollment in pre-school education and then – after an enrollment ratio of 
slightly more than half of the student population – to decrease with enrollment in pre-school 
education. Also, longer pre-school cycles were predicted to decrease the FBEs. Thus, systems 
of extensive early-childhood education and comprehensive schooling were supposed to 
increase equality of educational opportunity.  
Our empirical results suggest that the model describes the relationship between a country’s 
education policies and the extent to which the country achieves equality of educational 
opportunity very well. Different specifications consistently indicate the importance of 
extensive early-childhood education and late tracking. Apart from the variables captured by 
the model, we also tested the effects of several other systemic features on the FBEs. The 
estimated FBEs increase with the share of private expenditure in total educational 
expenditure, but decrease with the share of privately managed schools. By contrast, several 
other country-specific features do not seem to be significantly related to the degree of equality 
of educational opportunity achieved. This is true for the level of educational expenditure, GNI 
per capita, the length of the average school day and the official school starting age. In the 
sample of OECD countries, there is also no evidence for an efficiency-equity tradeoff in 
education, in the sense that more equal education systems would systematically show lower 
mean performance of their students.    27
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition and Source of Data 
Variable  Definition and Year of Observation  Source 
Age of first tracking  Age of students at the time of first streaming, different 
years since 1999 
European Commission 
(1999, 2000), detailed 
country-specific inquiries
Pre-school enrollment  Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, 1987 
and 1991, respectively 
UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (2003) 
Pre-school duration  Duration of pre-primary education, 1988 and 1992, 
respectively 




Current expenditure per student in pre-primary, primary 
and secondary schooling, 1995 
UNESCO (1998, 2000) 




Private expenditure share  Proportion of private sources of funds for educational 
institutions (after transfers from public sources), all 
levels of education, 1999 
OECD (2002: 212), 
Table B4.1 
Private enrollment share  Private enrollment as percentage of total enrollment, 
general secondary education, 1995 and 1996, resp. 
UNESCO (1998, 2000) 
Full-day schooling  Dummy: 1 if in the respective country, full-time 
schooling is the rule, different years since 1999 
Renz (1994), detailed 
country-specific inquiries
Start of primary education  Age of students at start of primary education, 1988 and 
1992, respectively 
UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (2003) 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1453 Kevin Milligan and Michael Smart, Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics, April 2005 
 
1454 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, To Draft or not to Draft? Efficiency, 
Generational Incidence, and Political Economy of Military Conscription, April 2005 
 
1455 Maurice Kugler and Hillel Rapoport, Skilled Emigration, Business Networks and 
Foreign Direct Investment, April 2005 
 
1456 Yin-Wong Cheung and Eiji Fujii, Cross-Country Relative Price Volatility: Effects of 
Market Structure, April 2005 
 
1457 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and Relative Reliance on Tariffs: 
Theory and Evidence, April 2005 
 
1458 Monika Bütler, Olivia Huguenin and Federica Teppa, Why Forcing People to Save for 
Retirement may Backfire, April 2005 
 
1459 Jos Jansen, The Effects of Disclosure Regulation of an Innovative Firm, April 2005 
 
1460 Helge Bennmarker, Kenneth Carling and Bertil Holmlund, Do Benefit Hikes Damage 
Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms, May 2005 
 
1461 Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller, Merger without Cost Advantages, 
May 2005 
 
1462 Louis Eeckhoudt and Harris Schlesinger, Putting Risk in its Proper Place, May 2005 
 
1463 Hui Huang, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, Trade Liberalization in a Joint Spatial 
Inter-Temporal Trade Model, May 2005 
 
1464 Mikael Priks, Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default 
Risk and Monitoring Costs, May 2005 
 
1465 François Ortalo-Magné and Sven Rady, Heterogeneity within Communities: A 
Stochastic Model with Tenure Choice, May 2005 
 
1466 Jukka Pirttilä and Sanna Tenhunen, Pawns and Queens Revisited: Public Provision of 
Private Goods when Individuals make Mistakes, May 2005 
 
1467 Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness and the Optimal 
Allocation of Ownership Rights, May 2005 
 
1468 Bruno S. Frey, Knight Fever – Towards an Economics of Awards, May 2005 
 
  
1469 Torberg Falch and Marte Rønning, The Influence of Student Achievement on Teacher 
Turnover, May 2005 
 
1470 John Komlos and Peter Salamon, The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility 
Functions, May 2005 
 
1471 Hui Huang, Yi Wang, Yiming Wang, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, A Trade 
Model with an Optimal Exchange Rate Motivated by Current Discussion of a Chinese 
Renminbi Float, May 2005 
 
1472 Helge Holden, Lars Holden and Steinar Holden, Contract Adjustment under 
Uncertainty, May 2005 
 
1473 Kai A. Konrad, Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions, May 2005 
 
1474 Ingo Vogelsang, Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation, 
May 2005 
 
1475 Spiros Bougheas and Raymond Riezman, Trade and the Distribution of Human Capital, 
June 2005 
 
1476 Vesa Kanniainen, Seppo Kari and Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja, The Start-Up and Growth 
Stages in Enterprise Formation: The “New View” of Dividend Taxation Reconsidered, 
June 2005 
 
1477 M. Hashem Pesaran, L. Vanessa Smith and Ron P. Smith, What if the UK had Joined 
the Euro in 1999? An Empirical Evaluation Using a Global VAR, June 2005 
 
1478 Chang Woon Nam and Doina Maria Radulescu, Effects of Corporate Tax Reforms on 
SMEs’ Investment Decisions under the Particular Consideration of Inflation, June 2005 
 
1479 Panos Hatzipanayotou, Sajal Lahiri and Michael S. Michael, Globalization, Cross-
Border Pollution and Welfare, June 2005 
 
1480 John Whalley, Pitfalls in the Use of Ad valorem Equivalent Representations of the 
Trade Impacts of Domestic Policies, June 2005 
 
1481 Edward B. Barbier and Michael Rauscher, Trade and Development in a Labor Surplus 
Economy, June 2005 
 
1482 Harrie A. A. Verbon and Cees A. Withagen, Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal 
System, June 2005 
 
1483 Hendrik Hakenes and Andreas Irmen, On the Long-Run Evolution of Technological 
Knowledge, June 2005 
 




1485 Carsten Hefeker, Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union, 
June 2005 
 
1486 Ondřej Schneider and Jan Zápal, Fiscal Policy in New EU Member States – Go East, 
Prudent Man!, June 2005 
 
1487 Christian Schultz, Virtual Capacity and Competition, June 2005 
 
1488 Yvan Lengwiler and Elmar Wolfstetter, Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in 
Auctions, June 2005 
 
1489 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Does Germany Collect Revenue from Taxing 
Capital Income?, June 2005 
 
1490 Axel Dreher and Panu Poutvaara, Student Flows and Migration: An Empirical Analysis, 
June 2005 
 
1491 Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel, Interregional Redistribution and Budget Institutions 
under Asymmetric Information, June 2005 
 
1492 Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe, July 2005 
 
1493 Kurt R. Brekke and Michael Kuhn, Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical 
Markets, July 2005 
 
1494 Martín Gonzalez-Eiras and Dirk Niepelt, Sustaining Social Security, July 2005 
 
1495 Alfons J. Weichenrieder, (Why) Do we need Corporate Taxation?, July 2005 
 
1496 Paolo M. Panteghini, S-Based Taxation under Default Risk, July 2005 
 
1497 Panos Hatzipanayotou and Michael S. Michael, Migration, Tied Foreign Aid and the 
Welfare State, July 2005 
 
1498 Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, BRICSAM and the Non-WTO, July 2005 
 
1499 Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider and Jan Zápal, A Fiscal Rule that has Teeth: A 
Suggestion for a ‘Fiscal Sustainability Council’ underpinned by the Financial Markets, 
July 2005 
 
1500 J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel, Sabotaging Potential Rivals, July 2005 
 
1501 Heikki Oksanen, Actuarial Neutrality across Generations Applied to Public Pensions 
under Population Ageing: Effects on Government Finances and National Saving, July 
2005 
 
1502 Xenia Matschke, Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing 
Industries, July 2005 
  
1503 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Why Parallel Trade may Raise Producers Profits, July 
2005 
 
1504 Alberto Bisin and Piero Gottardi, Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse 
Selection, July 2005 
 
1505 Peter A. Zadrozny, Necessary and Sufficient Restrictions for Existence of a Unique 
Fourth Moment of a Univariate GARCH(p,q) Process, July 2005 
 
1506 Rainer Niemann and Corinna Treisch, Group Taxation, Asymmetric Taxation and 
Cross-Border Investment Incentives in Austria, July 2005 
 
1507 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, Optimal Pest Control in 
Agriculture, July 2005 
 
1508 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay and Prabir De, Promotion of Trade and Investments between 
China and India: The Case of Southwest China and East and Northeast India, July 2005 
 
1509 Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: 
Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare, July 2005 
 
1510 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, Globalization 
and Domestic Conflict, July 2005 
 
1511 Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Non-Linear Exchange 
Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A Bumpy Road towards a Honeymoon – Some 
Evidence from the ERM, ERM2 and Selected New EU Member States, July 2005 
 
1512 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1513 Christian Keuschnigg and Martin D. Dietz, A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax, July 
2005 
 
1514 Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi, Monitoring a Common Agent: 
Implications for Financial Contracting, August 2005 
 
1515 Volker Grossmann and Panu Poutvaara, Pareto-Improving Bequest Taxation, August 
2005 
 
1516 Lars P. Feld and Emmanuelle Reulier, Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: 
Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons, August 2005 
 
1517 Kira Boerner and Silke Uebelmesser, Migration and the Welfare State: The Economic 
Power of the Non-Voter?, August 2005 
 
1518 Gabriela Schütz, Heinrich W. Ursprung and Ludger Wößmann, Education Policy and 
Equality of Opportunity, August 2005 